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Why Should We Not Protest For 
Consumption Tax Reduction? 
 
Consumption Tax Rate as a Partial 
Mechanism For Increasing Consumer Wealth 
 
LIMOR RIZA AND NOAM SHER* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
If you are an activist protesting against the high costs of living, we 
would like to offer you one suggestion: do not demand that the govern-
ment reduce consumption tax. Social activists tend to believe that a 
government policy reducing consumption tax can, by itself, benefit the 
general population. This paper explains our suggestion to the contrary. 
The tax field alone is insufficient for consumption tax reduction to 
be effective in increasing consumer wealth over benefitting suppliers. 
Due to cognitive biases, or heuristics, when the government changes 
consumption tax rates in order to increase consumers’ well-being, sup-
pliers are able to fix market prices above the normal equilibrium 
prices; this is especially true with low-priced and necessity goods. 
This article examines four product price display regimes as possi-
ble solutions to this problem: ( 1 )  the tax inclusive pricing rule, 
common in EU countries, requiring suppliers to include the tax in the 
display price of each product; (2) the tax exclusive pricing rule, com-
mon in North America, permitting suppliers to display the price of each 
product without the tax amount; (3) the net and total price rule, which 
we suggest as the preferable solution, requiring suppliers to present 
net and final prices for each product; and (4) the comparative net and 
total price rule, which is very similar to the net and total price rule 
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but with the addition of comparative data and is more costly to apply. 
Among these four different product price display regimes, the net 
and total price rule is ultimately preferable as it effectively reduces the 
influence of heuristics at a minimal cost, which thereby best promotes 
distributional justice and economic efficiency. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 global economic crisis sent activists to the streets de-
manding1, among other things, a reduction in consumption tax rates. 
These activists tend to believe that a government policy reducing con-
sumption tax can benefit the general population.2 Reducing the con-
sumption tax rate, in itself, however, is not the most optimal solution to 
increase consumer wealth. Even if the consumption tax cuts are done 
with the aim to increase consumer wealth, and even if consumers have 
foreknowledge of such a reform, their cognitive biases will still prevent 
them from internalizing this information into their daily consumption 
habits. The problem here is not only that a tax is hidden from its con-
sumers but that due to its disguise, suppliers are able to gain extra prof-
its at the expense of the consumer. Therefore, without additional super-
vision, reductions in consumption taxes such as value-added tax 
(VAT) or retail sales tax (RST)3 cannot be completely shifted to con-
sumers. This paper will focus its analysis primarily on necessities 
purchased in large quantities. 
First, this paper will illustrate that in a product market, suppliers 
take advantage of market failures to profit from consumption tax cuts 
or to minimize their losses, which results in shifting the lion’s share of 
the burden to consumers. In the pricing regime model this article sug-
gests, imperfectly rational consumers have limited information regard-
ing the supply and demand curve. Whenever the government increases 
or decreases consumption taxes, consumers will likely try to estimate 
the corresponding normal changes (or also known as the “honest” 
 
* Limor Riza is an assistant professor of law at the Carmel Academic Center School of Law, Isra-
el.  Noam Sher is an assistant professor of law at the Carmel Academic Center School of Law, 
Israel.  
 1. See Anup Shah, Public Protests Around the World, Global Issues, 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/45/public-protests-around-the-world (last updated Nov. 07, 
2011) (see subsection “Protests Due to the Global Financial Crisis, 2008” for discussion on pro-
testors responding to the 2008 Global financial crisis). 
 2. Ariel Harkham, Rothschild Boulevard: Road to a better Israel, THE JERUSALEM POST, 
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Rothschild-Boulevard-Road-to-a-better-
Israel.  
 3. For definitions and explanations of the terms consumption tax and its varieties, in-
cluding VAT and RST, see infra Section I. 
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changes in product prices that suppliers would make to address the ac-
tual cost of production without market manipulation) in the market 
equilibrium. We claim that, due to heuristics such as representative-
ness, availability and anchoring,4 consumers’ predictions of market be-
havior are systematically biased. Moreover, since suppliers have better 
knowledge of the structure of supply and demand and can more accu-
rately predict consumers’ biases, they are more likely able to fix market 
prices above the normal equilibrium level whenever the government 
changes the consumption tax rate. This phenomenon typically has the 
strongest effect on necessary and low-priced goods, which are typically 
bought periodically and in large quantities. 
This paper will then argue for the need of further supervision in 
order to avoid market abuse by suppliers; several price display re-
gimes are examined as possible solutions to this problem.5 The first is 
the simple tax inclusive pricing rule (tax inclusive rule), commonly ap-
plied in European Union countries.6 According to this rule, suppliers 
should include the tax in the display price of each product. The 
second is the simple tax exclusive pricing rule (tax exclusive rule), 
commonly applied in North America;7  this rule allows suppliers to pre-
sent the price of each product without taxes. The third proffered solu-
tion is a strict product price display rule that requires suppliers to pre-
sent the net and final prices for each product (net and total price rule). 
More specifically, this rule requires suppliers to state, for each product, 
the net price (before tax), the tax rate, the tax amount, and the total final 
price (after tax is added). Unlike the other price display regimes, this 
one would promote distributional justice and economic efficiency by 
mitigating the impact of consumers’ heuristics on purchasing decisions 
when prices fall due to tax rate cuts. This distributional effect can be 
achieved at minimum costs while within the existing framework of con-
sumer protection laws. The fourth solution, the comparative net and to-
tal price rule, is more complex as it obliges suppliers to show the in-
formation required under the net and total price rule. This solution, 
however, must also have comparative data and is more costly to apply. 
This paper recommends the third price display regime. 
The paper is organized as follows: section I introduces and dis-
 
 4. For a discussion of heuristics in general and the representativeness, availability and 
anchoring heuristics in particular, see infra Section V. 
 5. For a detailed description of the current price display regimes, including the tax in-
clusive and tax exclusive rules, see infra Section I. 
 6. See Jacob Nussim, To Confuse and Protect: Taxes and Consumer Protection, 1 COLUM. 
J. TAX. L. 218, 224 (2010). 
 7. Id. 
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cusses tax terminology, consumption taxes, and the consumption taxes’ 
distinct forms - mainly VAT and RST; section II briefly reviews the 
theoretical literature on consumption taxes and its pros and cons vis-
à-vis income tax; section III examines the problem in consumers trying 
to follow product price changes due to consumption tax rate changes; 
section IV discusses the theoretical and empirical literature on tax inclu-
sive versus exclusive systems; section V analyzes supplier and consum-
er behavior in product markets whenever the government changes the 
consumption tax rate, explains how the representativeness, availability 
and anchoring cause bias in consumers’ predictions of market behavior, 
which allows suppliers to manipulate product prices; section VI dis-
cusses which of the four possible price display rules best addresses the 
problem of systematic consumer bias; and finally, section VII presents 
this paper’s conclusions. 
I. CONSUMPTION TAX – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
Consumption tax refers to a “tax base” that focuses on consump-
tion rather than income or wealth.8  The various forms of consumption 
taxes are different with respect to who ultimately bears the tax burden: 
consumers, workers or businesses.9 
Consumption tax has multiple forms, including the retail sales 
tax (RST), value-added tax (VAT), the Hall–Rabushka flat-tax,10 and 
X-tax.11 A majority of the United States apply RST, which implements 
a tax on the final sale price of products at the retail level.12 A retail sale 
is one where a business sells either goods or services to consumers.13 
Here, tax is added only at the last link of the sales chain and is thereby 
collected from the businesses rather than from its consumers.14 
 
 8. JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 195 (4th ed. 2004). 
 9. Id. at 197. 
 10. Aimed at replacing the income-based tax system, the flat tax system imposes a uniform 
rate (19%) on consumption for all businesses and individuals. In this system businesses can 
deduct wages and capital investments from their tax base, while individuals are taxed only for 
their wages and pensions. In addition, a family of four receives an exemption of $25,500. 
See ROBERT E. HALL  & A L V I N  RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2007); see also SLEMROD & 
BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 196.  
 11. The X tax conceived by Professor Bradford is a variant of the flat tax, but with pro-
gressive rates. In other words, it is similar to VAT with two main distinctions: first, salaries are 
also deducted as inputs by businesses, and second, it has several tax brackets. See, e.g., DAVID F. 
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 59-74 (1986); see generally DAVID F. 
BRADFORD, THE X TAX IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (2003), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/~ceps/workingpapers/93bradford.pdf. 
 12. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 195. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
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Although North America favors RST, VAT is more common 
worldwide; in fact, the United States is the only country in the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that does 
not apply VAT.15  VAT is a more popular choice due to the ease of fa-
cilitating its enforcement16 and collecting revenue;17 it is also more dif-
ficult to evade the requirements under VAT than it is under RST. VAT 
imposes the tax value amount in each transaction in the chain of the 
production.18 While each producer in each stage of production must pay 
tax on its output;19 the inputs purchased from registered traders are re-
duced.  So in the end, it is ultimately the consumers who bear the final 
tax on the sale of a particular good or service. 
A flat tax is similar to VAT because the tax is also levied on busi-
nesses for its outputs minus its inputs;20 it differs from VAT in that 
businesses can deduct wages, although these wages are still taxed at the 
individual level.21 For simplicity sake in the paper, we refer to “con-
sumption tax” as a whole (although it is necessary to keep in mind that 
it has various forms that differ in many respects, such as differences in 
compliance costs).22 We will focus primarily on RST and VAT since 
they are more prevalent and share similarities that are relevant for the 
purposes of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 15. Id. See also The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 
http://www.oecd.org/about/ (explaining that the OECD has over 34 member countries, including 
Israel). 
 16. Id. 
 17. It was empirically tested that countries employing VAT raise more revenue than coun-
tries that did not adopt the VAT system, though the effect is not significant. It was also found that 
using a VAT system alone increased government size by exploiting its effectiveness. See Mi-
chael Keen & Ben Lockwood, Is the VAT a Money Machine? 59(4) NAT’L TAX J. 905-28 
(2006). 
 18. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 196. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See generally id. at 194-97. 
 21. Id. at 196. 
 22. See THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, 
AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX SYSTEM 37 (Nov. 2005), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Simple-Fair-and-Pro-Growth-
Proposals-to-Fix-Americas-Tax-System-11-2005.pdf. 
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II. TAX THEORIES 
Whether a consumption or comprehensive income tax base23 is 
more preferable has been the subject of extensive literature.24 The fol-
lowing section highlights some of the traditional differences between 
the two. 
A.  The Saving Argument 
One of the main differences between income tax and consumption 
tax is the effect of each tax on individual savings. Many argue that in-
come tax reduces the incentive to save money since the interests at-
tached to the money themselves are subject to taxation.25 In this respect, 
consumption taxation thereby promotes neutrality since it is neutral 
between present and future consumption; it does not affect returns if the 
taxpayer chooses to consume today or some later time in the future.26 
B.  The Simplification Argument 
The advantages of consumption tax are clear in terms of the simplifi-
cation argument. Consumption tax is much easier to levy and calculate 
than income tax. For instance, consumption tax avoids the difficulties 
involved in evaluating depreciation rules and taxing undistributed in-
come.27 Income tax, on the other hand, involves complex evaluations 
such as defining income, determining when it is realized, which ex-
penses should be deducted, whether exemptions or credits are availa-
 
 23. The American tax system is closer to an income-based rather than a consumption-
based model. See, for example, id. at 21 (“Our tax base . . . most closely resembles an income tax 
base system, but does not include certain forms of both cash and noncash income that would be 
part of a comprehensive income tax base.”). 
 24. The longstanding debate on consumption versus income tax base can be traced to Wil-
liam D. Andrews, who supports using consumption tax, and Alvin C. Warren, who argues in 
favor of income tax. See, e.g., William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Person-
al Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income 
Tax]; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Comments, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Person-
al Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 931 (1975) [hereinafter Warren, Fairness and Personal 
Income Tax]; William D. Andrews, Response, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to 
Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 947 (1975) [hereinafter Andrews, Reply to Professor 
Warren]; Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1081, 1082 (1980) [hereinafter Warren, Consumption Tax Fairer Than Income Tax?]; Barba-
ra H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 961 (1992). 
 25. SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 197.  
 26. Id. at 197-98; see also RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 249 
(1959). 
 27. See for example, BLUEPRINT FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 9, 44 (Dep’t of Treasury Janu-
ary 1977), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/full.pdf. 
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ble, and etc. 28 In addition, taxable income may be subject to progressive 
tax rates, which would only further complicate tax estimation.29 In many 
instances, consumption tax in the form of RST or VAT is at a fixed 
flat rate, as a result, the tax burden can be easily calculated. Even if 
there are various rates in addition to the standard consumption tax rate 
(such as reduced rates for food or drug products), it is still easier to 
evaluate consumption tax than income tax. 
A recent survey by Money magazine proved the complexity of 
calculating income tax.30 In the survey, dozens of tax experts were 
asked to calculate the tax liability of a given taxpayer and each expert 
evaluated the given taxpayer’s tax liability very differently. The highest 
estimation, for instance, was almost double the amount of the lowest 
estimation (which was closest to the correct answer).31 
C.  The Equity Argument 
Another argument addresses the progressive variable, and thus eq-
uitable nature of consumption taxes. Whether consumption or income 
taxation is a more accurate measure of taxpayers’ ability to pay is de-
batable, but if the focus remains only on one taxable year, it could be 
said that consumption tax is regressive while income tax is progres-
sive.32 Because low-income families have a tendency to consume 
most, if not all, of their income, this results in those families ultimate-
ly facing a higher tax burden than families with a higher income. In 
that respect, a flat-rate consumption tax will clearly have a regressive 
effect. On the other hand, if one’s lifecycle endowment is the consid-
ered focus rather than one’s annual income combined with any money 
the taxpayer may have borrowed in his or her lifetime, the differences 
between these two types of taxes are actually very minimal.33 This 
claim, however, assumes that income does not include certain forms of 
wealth, such as gifts and inheritances, and that taxpayers will also con-
sume their income over a lifetime. Nevertheless, some scholars still 
 
 28. See generally id. 
 29. Id. at 36. 
 30. The survey was presented in SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 159. 
 31. Id. 
 32. “A tax is progressive tax if the ratio of taxes to income rises as income increases. . . and 
regressive if the ratio falls as income increases.” See TAXATION & TAX POLICY 304 (Joseph J. 
Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).   
 33. See SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 8, at 208 (explaining that, “Similarly, over a life-
time, a consumption tax with graduated rates could in principle achieve about the same degree of 
progressivity as a graduated income tax; one is not inherently more progressive than the other. 
Rather, the degree of progressivity depends largely on the kind of tax rates that we impose, which 
is in principle a separate issue than the tax base the rates apply to.”).  
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claim that taxing consumption is more horizontally equitable due to its 
taxation of savings.34 If one compares two families with similar in-
comes, the family that saves its income will pay more in taxes due to the 
return on the family’s savings. The consumption tax base, on the other 
hand, would tax the two families equally.35 
A recent OECD empirical study shows that the use of consump-
tion tax is significantly less distortive of the economy than corporate or 
individual income taxes.36 This is, inter alia, partly true since taxing 
consumption is generally less progressive than taxing income.37 In addi-
tion, this result is mainly due to the restriction on the free movement of 
services and goods,38 which is more pronounced in larger countries and 
countries with closed borders (unlike EU member states).39 
When assessing the adverse effect of a  given  tax  on  the  
economy,  we  should also consider whether the consumption tax bur-
den is too high. In some countries where governments apply both in-
come and consumption taxes, most of the tax burden is due to the taxa-
tion of consumption rather than income.40 
Thus far, the pros and cons of taxing consumption rather than in-
come have been debated exclusively within the discourse of the tax dis-
cipline. We posit that introducing other disciplines can provide im-
portant insight, since these disciplines interact with and complement the 
tax field. In doing so, one of the basic flaws of implementing consump-
tion taxes (that its cut will not fully increase consumers’ wealth) can be 
overcome and thereby shift the scales in favor of using this form of tax-
ation. 
III. THE PROBLEM 
Let us start with a simple example: assume a country levies VAT at 
a 16% rate. Due to severe criticism about the falling standard of living 
and the increasing economic burden on the middle class, the govern-
ment decides to lower the VAT by one percentage point. As a result, if 
 
 34. See id. (noting that, “many economists would also argue that, again ignoring bequests 
and inheritances, a consumption tax is more horizontally equitable than a comprehensive income 
tax.”).  
 35. See id.  
 36. OECD, Growth-oriented Tax Policy Reform Recommendations, in TAX POLICY REFORM 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 9, 20-21 (2010). 
 37. Id. at 20.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id.  
 40. For a comparison of the overall general consumption tax burden with total taxes in 
OECD countries, see id. at 28-30. 
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the product price of an item before tax is $5, then the tax will be re-
duced by only 5 cents from $5.80 to $5.75 after tax (this is assuming 
that the entire cut is being shifted to the consumer). The question then 
becomes: will the consumer be aware of the price reduction if only the 
final price is displayed in stores? It is important to remember that the 
tax cut would apply to all the products, not just to one. While consum-
ers may not be able to sense the price changes through their daily 
shopping routines,41 they should, however, be able to assess the tax cut 
after a period of time through assessing the cumulative purchases of 
daily products. Price displays with consumption tax cut amounts are 
therefore critical to consumer welfare.42 
By addressing this issue from a purely tax perspective, the sub-
stitution effect43 then remains unchanged since the product prices them-
selves have not changed and thus, alter the products’ relative prices. 
The only change would then be the additional benefit producers (or 
the other links along the distribution chain, such as supermarket own-
ers, etc.) receive in terms of consumer expenditure. Despite this im-
mediate benefit to the producers, in the long run, consumers may 
face the income effect44 since the tax burden on their income is not less-
ened by the reform. This argument further supports the conclusion of 
why price display is so critical to consumers. 
How product prices are displayed varies between different states 
and countries. In general, there are two main systems: tax inclusive 
and tax exclusive pricing. European Union (EU) countries45 and Israel46 
apply the tax inclusive system, therefore, the prices displayed include 
the VAT. Including VAT in price displays is typically justified in con-
sumer protection law because it provides consumers with full and unam-
 
 41. See Nussim, supra note 6, at 226-27. 
 42. Id. at 226 (“This confusion diminishes consumer utility, which, in turn, diminishes so-
cial welfare. A preventative regulatory measure in the form of price indication supposedly elimi-
nates this confusion and is thus welfare-increasing.”). 
 43. For a different discussion of the substitution effect, see Nussim, supra note 6, at 234-243 
(“The substitution effect, describes changes in taxpayer behavior due to changes in relative prices. 
Taxes may change relative prices—or, in other words, the relative attractiveness—of different 
activities and modes of behavior.”). 
 44. The income effect is the effect of price changes in real income. “The income effect rep-
resents the change in taxpayer behavior solely due to the change in wealth.” Id.  
 45. This is a result of applying both the VAT system and product pricing rules. EU mem-
bers are subject to the VAT system under the latest effective Directive 2006/112/EC of the 
Council of the European Union. See Council Directive 2006/112, 2006 O.J. (L 347) 1 (EC), 
available at http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2006L0112:20110101:EN:PDF. The 
obligation to display full prices is set forth in Directive 98/6/EC, infra note 46. 
 46. See Consumer Protection Law, 5741-1981, SH No. 1023, p. 248, §§ 17a-17b (Isr.)  
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biguous information about the final price that consumers will pay. The 
European Parliament and Council, for instance, adopted a Directive 
calling its Member states to implement product-pricing rules that in-
clude the taxes in the final product price in these states’ domestic laws.47 
There are nevertheless some jurisdictions that require separate 
presentation of the product’s price and the tax that will subsequently be 
imposed on it (tax exclusive pricing); this appears to be the case in only 
two countries: the United States and Canada.48 In these jurisdictions, the 
tax is later revealed and added to the product price only at the cash reg-
ister when the consumer pays. The price displayed in the store price tag 
is not the final price. For tourists unfamiliar with the system, the real 
final price will typically come as a surprise at the cash register because 
it is not until this stage that tax is added. When consumers are only in-
formed of the actual price at the final stage of the purchasing process, 
their ability to make decisions based on their due diligence is impaired 
because the final price is not visible on the price tags for the consum-
ers to consider. Apparently, consumers prefer the presentation of final 
price on products since it saves them the trouble of calculating the final 
price. As a result, countries have transitioned from a tax exclusive sys-
tem to a tax inclusive system since consumers seem to prefer paying 
the tax without noticing its burden only in the final stage of purchas-
ing.49 
 
 47. See Council Directive 98/6, 1998 O.J. (L 080) 27-31 (EC), on consumer protection in the 
indication of the prices of products offered to consumers. Article 2(a) of the Directive states: “For 
the purposes of this Directive: (a) selling price shall mean the final price for a unit of the prod-
uct, or a given quantity of the product, including VAT and all other taxes”. For the Directive 
Status, see http://www.kapitalmarktrecht-im- inter-
net.eu/en/Areas%20of%20Law/Private_Law/European_Law/42/Directive_98_6_EG.htm. This 
directive was also extended to e-commerce in Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (8 
June 2000) – on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal 
Market (Directive on electronic commerce), see Official Journal L. 178, 17/7/2000, pages 1-16. 
 48. With some exceptions, see David M. Sherman, Policy Forum: Tax-Included Pricing 
for HST – Are We There Yet?, 57(4) CANADIAN TAX J.  839, 845 (2009) and Richard M. 
Bird, Policy Forum: Visibility and Accountability – Is Tax-Inclusive Pricing a Good Thing?, 
58(1) CANADIAN TAX J. 63, 68 (2010). In Canada, various taxes such as the goods and ser-
vices tax (GST), harmonized sales tax (HST); the provincial retail sales tax (RST) are generally 
not displayed due to political and technical reasons. Sherman supra note 48, at 844; Bird supra note 
48, at 69-70. Under the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict., c.3 (UK)), provincial 
governments have legislative discretion and latitude as to whether to apply tax included or ex-
cluded display. Provinces favor the tax-excluded system. Sherman supra note 48, at 847-849. 
There are, however, some technical issues involved in the Canadian system. For example, how 
should a product be displayed on a website where it can be sold to people who live in different 
provinces (which apply different tax rates)?  Id. at 853. 
 49. This was the case in Japan. See Bird, supra note 48, at 68 n.11 (quoting Hiromitsu Ishi). 
Bird believes that the Canadians also dislike the GST since they constantly remember its en-
actment and introduction. See id. at 73. 
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Legislation mandating tax inclusion in its price display is only 
preferential when the prices are fixed. This conclusion, however, is 
overridden when consumption tax rates vary, especially when they vary 
in favor of consumers.50 
There is empirical research showing that consumption tax cuts are 
not necessarily shifted to consumers.51  For instance, in 2009, the 
French VAT rate on restaurant and catering service products was dra-
matically lowered from 
19.6% to 5.5%;52 the assumption was that this reduction would 
stimulate the industry and ultimately reduce consumer expenditure. 
Statistical analysis demonstrated, however, that following this cut, ex-
penditure on restaurant services dropped in July that year by only 
1.1%, in August by 0.2%, in September by 0.1%, and by in October 
2009 by 0.1%. Only 30% of the cut was shifted to the consumers.53 Most 
empirical studies, however, only apply to basic products rather than 
luxury items.54 Ultimately, the ability to shift the tax cut depends on 
demand elasticity and demand elasticity in groceries (particularly in 
basic products) appears to be lower, particularly by lower income con-
sumers.55 
 
 
 50. In Israel, the VAT has been changed 14 times and reduced 6 times since it was enacted 
in 1975: in October 1985 it was reduced from 17% to 15%; in January 1993 was reduced from 
18% to 17%; in March 2004 it was reduced again from 18% to 17%; in September 2005 it was 
further cut to 16.5%; in July 2006 it was reduced further to 15.5%; in January 2010 the VAT was 
reduced from 16.5% to 16%. See Buy it In Israel Staff, Good news for homebuyers: Israel lowers 
VAT rate to 16%, BUY IT IN ISRAEL, (Jan 5, 2010) www.buyitinisrael.com/good-news-for-
homebuyers-israel-lowers-vat-rate-to-16; see also International VAT and GST rates 2014, 
VATLIVE, www.vatlive.com/vat-rates/international-vat-and-gst-rates (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).  
 51. See, for example, the different studies described by Alain Charlet & Jeffrey Owens, An 
International Perspective on VAT, 59 TAX NOTES INT’L 949 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/45/46073502.pdf. 
 52. Id. at 950.  
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 949.  
 55. See the discussion on price elasticity of demand of luxuries versus necessities in 
STANLEY L. BRUE AND CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND 
POLICIES 362 (16th ed. 2005), see also Chapter 10: Annual Summary of Israeli Tax Authorities  
2005: differential VAT on groceries and its impact on the income gap, available at 
http://ozar.mof.gov.il/taxes/Year2005Summary/10.pdf. Some studies focus on income level, 
mainly of low-income groups, and its effect on the elasticity of demand for food, see Tatiana 
Andreyeva, Kelly D. Brownell and Michael W. Long, The Impact of Food Prices on Consump-
tion: A Systematic Review, 100(2) AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 216 (2010) and mainly references in n. 
18-20 and ns. 34-35. 
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IV. RELATED LITERATURE 
While extensive writings exist concerning the pros and cons of 
both the tax inclusive and tax exclusive systems,56 the main focus of 
these writings is somewhat different than ours. The empirical studies, 
discussed below, are either in support of the tax inclusive or tax exclu-
sive system; the debate between which system is more superior is not 
the objective of this note. Rather, the focus of this note is centered on 
deciding which system should be adopted when a tax cut is introduced 
with the aim of benefiting consumers. 
A field study conducted in Canada examined which system is 
preferable: an inclusive system (such as VAT) or an exclusive system 
(such as RST).57 Canada was an ideal location for the study because 
certain provinces in Canada had replaced the RST with a tax inclusive 
system.58 Under the RST system, businesses are subject to a  higher tax 
burden.59 It was believed that substituting the RST system with the 
VAT system would shift (e.g. through higher prices) the tax burden 
from businesses to consumers, thereby hindering tax reform due to the 
political consequences of such a shift.60 
The field study further illustrated that prices changed at relatively 
the same rate as the changes in tax when “[e]ach one per cent increase 
in costs induced by taxes leads to approximately a one per cent in-
crease (or sometimes a bit more) in the price paid by consumers.”61 
Therefore, according to the study, moving from one system to another 
had little distributional effect.62 
 
 56. See, e.g. ,  Sherman, supra note 48; see also Bird, supra note 48. Sherman supports 
the tax inclusive system for macroeconomic reasons: first, contrary to the exclusive system, it 
does not deter consumers from leaving products at the cash register; second, people are better off 
when they pay the price they are used to by advertising; and third, psychologically, it encour-
ages small business to buy large supplies since buying generates an input tax credit. Sherman 
supra note 48, at 844-45.  Bird, who analyses the pro and cons of tax exclusive or inclusive 
pricing on democratic grounds, argues that it should be easier to increase a tax when it is social-
ly desirable, “if people are not painfully reminded that the tax exists by having to add it sepa-
rately to the quoted price every time they buy something.” Bird supra note 48, at 75.  Bird re-
mains in favor of the tax exclusive system, however, since as he phrases it, it helps 
“build a sustainable democratic consensus in support of fiscal equilibrium.” Id. at 76.  
 57. See Michael Smart & Richard M. Bird, The Economic Incidence of Replacing a Retail 
Sales Tax by a Value-Added Tax: Evidence from Canadian Experience (Working Paper, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273780 (in Canada, some provinces apply a retail sales 
tax separately from the Federal Goods and Services Tax. Others apply a harmonized tax similar 
to VAT). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 3. 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. Id. at 5. 
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A different field study examined the effects of tax inclusive and 
exclusive displays on consumer demand; the field study concluded that 
the tax amounts displayed on products affected consumer behavior.63 
Since consumers reacted differently to the prices including the tax 
amount by purchasing less, the study concluded that tax salience is 
important to consuming decisions.64 This conclusion is based on two 
empirical studies: first, for a period of three weeks, the authors dis-
played in various shops cosmetic products with full tax; and in the sec-
ond, they checked the effect of tax on alcohol expenditure throughout an 
extensive period.65 
Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan,66 examined how to incorporate 
behavioral economics into tax policies through broad aspects: “(1) un-
derstanding the welfare consequences of taxation, (2) using the tax sys-
tem as a platform for policy implementation, and (3) employing taxes 
as an element of policy design.”67 Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 
examined how tax salience falls in line with simplicity,  a desirable 
principle in the optimal tax policy discussion.68 They claim that when 
implementing policies, policy makers striving to achieve efficiency and 
equity should take into account that consumers may be unaware of 
“complex or obscure taxes.”69 
In a different study, contrary to the first intuition of consumer pro-
tection law, Nussim claims that tax exclusive pricing is preferable.70 The 
premise behind this claim is that a confused consumer unaware of the 
tax’s existence is not negatively affected by the hidden tax since the 
substitution effect remains unchanged.71  Although this claim is some-
what appealing we believe that in some instances it may not hold. In re-
sponse to Nussim’s argument, we believe that while consumer confu-
sion may be experienced in the short run, it cannot sustain in the long 
run. In the long run, consumers will notice the effect on their income 
and welfare and be aware of the taxes. Moreover, it seems that the thesis 
cannot apply when tax rates are differential and not proportional where 
 
 63. Sherman, supra note 48, at 844. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evi-
dence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145-77 (2009). 
 66. William J. Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Economics 
and Tax Policy, 52 NAT’L TAX J. 375-86 (2009).  
 67. Id. at 376.  
 68. Id. at 378. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Nussim, supra note 6, at 229 n.51. 
 71. See id. at 222, 238. 
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relative prices remain unchanged,72 and when, due to tax change, buyers 
cannot afford buying a given product anymore. In addition, Nussim 
claims that competition is not influenced by the inclusive - exclusive tax 
system but rather by relative as opposed to absolute prices. Finally, alt-
hough Nussim treats competition with cross-border transactions when 
mobility is possible, he ignores the situation of a competition within a 
state with somewhat closed borders. 
Much of the extant literature does not focus on the harm caused 
to consumers at the expense of “producers” (usually meaning a few gi-
ant corporations whom control the market).73 This outcome (the harm to 
consumers at the expense of the producer) is not only inequitable, but 
also inefficient. Corporations benefit at the expense of the consumers’ 
individual consumption power; their enrichment is slight when com-
pared to the harm suffered by consumers. 
Many of the studies, such as those mentioned above, focus on the 
problems of having hidden tax. We support the idea that a hidden tax 
is flawed because this means that buyers are unaware of its existence. 
While this article supplements those studies by concentrating on the 
hidden tax shifted from consumers to “producers,” our analysis is fo-
cused on the influence that tax changes, specifically tax cuts, have on 
consumer welfare. 
V. SUPPLIER AND CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN PRODUCT MARKETS 
This section examines the application of behavioral economics to 
the question of how changes in consumption tax rates shape individual 
behavior and thereby affect markets.74  A strictly neoclassical theory is 
not nugatory or irrelevant, but when prices are intermittent and fluctuat-
ing, behavioral economics would enter into force more vigorously. 
A.  Markets with Rational Players 
A rational individual is an individual whose choices are in accord-
ance with completeness and transitivity.75 Relating that to the tax dis-
 
 72. The author is aware of this problem, see id. at Ch. IV.A. 
 73. Id. at 248.  
 74. Appling behavioral economics to different disciplines is not new, even in the area of 
taxation. See, for example, Congdon, Kling & Mullainathan, supra note 66. 
 75. See generally LAWRENCE E. BLUME & DAVID EASLEY, Rationality, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 
2008), available at 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_R000277&edition=current&q=ration
al%20completeness%20transitivity&topicid=&result_number=4; HAL R. VARIAN, 
INTERMEDIATE MICRECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 35 (8th ed. 1982).  
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course, a rational taxpayer can always compare two “tax bundles.”76 
If the taxpayer knows the tax amount of A and of B, he can always 
determine if one is preferable to the other or whether they are both 
equally attractive (the completeness requirement). Moreover, if a tax-
payer knows the tax burden of bundles A, B, and C, then according to 
transitivity, if A is preferable to B, and B is preferable to C, then A is 
preferable to C.77 A rational and self-interested taxpayer will always 
prefer a lower tax burden. The problem in behavioral economics in rela-
tion to the tax field is that despite this form of “rationality,” a lack of 
information will mean that the rational taxpayer is necessarily assumed 
to have made the rational choice based only on what the taxpayer 
knows. 
In pre-tax and post-tax reform we assume that persons—both firms 
and individuals—will always maximize utility.78 Naturally, for con-
sumers, the utility function is not solely based on the products’ prices 
but on other factors as well such as supermarkets’ salience and shop-
ping facilities. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that product 
prices still play a major role in estimating overall utility. The problem 
is that individuals’ ability to estimate their utility function is con-
strained in a world with fluctuating prices and asymmetric infor-
mation.79 
First, let’s assume we exist in a market with rational players and 
perfect competition. In addition, production and prices are also deter-
mined without government intervention (in Figure 1 below, the demand 
curve D and the supply curve St0 intersect at point A, creating the mar-
ket equilibrium with a product price p0 and the quantity q0). Under 
perfect competition, supplier would profit (the triangular area of p0AJ 
below) and consumer surplus (the triangular area of p0AH) would be at 
their highest. 
If the government decides to change the consumption tax rate and 
the consumers are rational, neoclassic economics predicts the expected 
changes in the product markets’ equilibrium.80 When a consumption 
tax is first imposed (see St1 in the graph below), suppliers and con-
 
 76. See Office of Best Practice Regulation, Influencing Consumer Behaviour: Improving 
Regulatory Design, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE AND DEREGULATION 
9-11 (2009), available at http://ris.dpmc.gov.au/files/2013/01/influencing-consumer-
behaviour.pdf [hereinafter Influencing Consumer Behaviour].  
 77. BLUME & EASLEY, supra note 75; see also VARIAN, supra note 75, at 35. 
 78. Id.  
 79. See Influencing Consumer Behaviour, supra note 76, at 11, 27, 59. 
 80. See VARIAN, supra note 75, at 296-310; see generally ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 335-42 (7th ed. 2009).  
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sumers must consider two different prices for each product: the final 
price paid by the consumer and the price after the tax reduction that 
suppliers get from the transaction. The difference between the two pric-
es for each product is the tax amount. 
Consumption tax entails added cost over the cost of production.81 
It means that both suppliers and consumers are facing a higher cost of 
production, or an increased supply curve for each product, assuming as 
in most cases that the tax is imposed directly onto suppliers and directly 
causes an upward shift of the supply curve (curve St1 in Figure 1 be-
low). This leads to a new equilibrium, one with reduced production 
and a higher final price for each product. For each product sold, suppli-
ers would receive the price paid by consumers minus the tax amount. 
With the new equilibrium, suppliers in each market face lower prices 
(ps1) and quantities (q1), therefore lowering profits (represented by the 
area of triangle ps1EJ in the graph below). On the other end, consumers 
face a higher price (including tax) (pc1) with a  lower quantity 
(q1), which would therefore reduce consumer surplus (represented by 
the area of triangle pc1BH). This applies, with the necessary changes 
having been made, if consumption tax changes again (see, for example, 
if it is raised again as represented in the graph to follow by St). 
 
 
 
 81. Id. 
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When the government increases the consumption tax rate, a new 
equilibrium arises. As a result, the aforementioned changes would take 
another step forward. This new equilibrium results in even lower prices 
and profits for suppliers while consumers, on the other hand, receive 
higher prices and a lower surplus. 
B.  Markets with Imperfectly Rational Consumers 
We do not claim that suppliers always manipulate consumers. This 
subsection concludes that even when the government does not consider 
tax changes in a society where the consumers are imperfectly rational, it 
is still plausible to assume that suppliers will not use heuristics to ma-
nipulate the markets. In addition, suppliers can earn revenues in excess 
of the profits predicted by neoclassic economics82 when prices change 
 
 82. See generally Roy E. Weintraub, Neoclassical Economics, LIBR. OF ECON & LIBERTY, 
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due to consumption tax changes. 
First, it is difficult for suppliers to manipulate markets without a 
“justifying” cause. Accordingly, this lack of market exploitation is due 
to both the consumers and suppliers’ perceptions of fairness, a theory 
propounded by behavioral economists.83 Daniel Kahneman, Jack 
L.Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler analyzed several studies illustrating 
how consumers’ knowledge of changes in market conditions—
conditions that typically justify suppliers’ reactions—constrain market 
adjustments.84 For example, when customers are unaware of the 
changes to suppliers costs, they will not anticipate changes in the 
market supply curve. Kahneman and his colleagues contend that even 
when the supply curve actually shifts, if the consumers do not anticipate 
the shift, they are likely to believe that the suppliers are deceiving them 
and will reject the price increases.85 
Second, based on the aforementioned analysis, we claim that 
suppliers are reluctant to change prices in product markets with 
asymmetric information about the supply curve. Consumers have lim-
ited information about the marginal costs of production, the additional 
supply costs relevant to market price determination, and the changes in 
product supply curves. Despite this asymmetric information, supplier 
desiring to maintain a positive reputation will not risk having their con-
sumers potentially suspect them of being dishonest by increasing the 
prices of their products.86 As a result, in a stable state (where there are 
no changes in production costs or taxes), given consumers’ “irrationali-
ty,” suppliers will not fully adjust prices to the levels predicted by neo-
classic economics. If the supply curve changes or if production costs 
rise as a result of events that consumers are unaware of, suppliers are 
likely to suffer losses due to their inability to raise prices without a 
“fair” cause. On the other hand, if the change in the supply curve is 
hidden from consumers and the production costs are lower, suppliers 
 
available at http://www.econlib.org/library/encl/NeoclassicalEconomics.html (last visited Dec. 
29, 2014). 
 83. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Con-
straint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECO. REV. 728 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking]; see also Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & 
Richard H. Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59(4) THE J. OF BUS. 285 
(1986) [hereinafter Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics]; see also Daniel Kahneman, 
Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the 
Coase Theorem, 98(6) J. OF POL. ECON. 1325-48 (1990) [hereinafter Experimental Tests of the 
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem].  
 84. Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking, supra note 83, at 735, 738-39. 
 85. Id. at 738-39. 
 86. See id. at 735. 
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can also gain extra profits from the consumers’ inability to detect the 
change in the internal production process. 
Despite the inconclusive findings, Kahneman, Knetsch, and Tha-
ler maintains that “[p]rice changes will be more responsive to variations 
of costs than to variations of demand, and more responsive to cost in-
creases than to cost decreases.”87 Those phenomena—referred to as 
“asymmetric price rigidity” 88 in the context of consumption tax chang-
es—could be explained by cognition biases, namely heuristics.89 The 
idea behind this is that since it is costly to absorb information, individu-
als would instead base their decisions on heuristics.90 
Oren Bar-Gill argues that imperfectly rational consumers rely on 
heuristics to estimate benefits and product prices.91 Since buyers suffer 
from systemic biases and misperceptions, sellers aware of these biases 
will specifically design their products, contracts, and prices in a manner 
to manipulate consumers.92 This type of behavior will lead to market in-
efficiency and consumer losses. 
In our model, as mentioned above, imperfectly rational consumers 
have very little information regarding the supply curve, which includes 
the producer’s marginal costs of production and other miscellaneous 
supply costs. Furthermore, consumers have minimal knowledge regard-
ing the structure of a product’s demand curve and are only slightly 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. For an explanation of asymmetric price rigidity when the market disturbances causing it 
are changes in inflationary or deflationary expectations, see Timur Kuran, Asymmetric Price Ri-
gidity and Inflationary Bias, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 373-82 (1983). For an explanation of asymmet-
ric price rigidity when the market disturbances causing it are the changes in demand in a 
duopoly market, see Richard Damania & Bill Z. Yang, Price Rigidity and Asymmetric Price 
Adjustment in a Repeated Oligopoly, 154 J. OF INST. AND THEORETICAL ECON. 659-79 (1998). 
 89. Heuristics were first introduced as a cause for market abnormalities by Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, 154 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-31 (1974). For a more detailed description and 
analysis of heuristics and their effects on consumer judgments, see JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds. 
1982); and see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Tom Gi-
lovich, Dale Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds. 2002). 
 90. See, for example, John Conlisk, Optimization Cost, 9 J. OF ECON. BEHAVIOR & 
ORGANIZATION 213-28 (1988); see also John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rationality?, 34 J. OF ECON. 
LITER. 669-70 (1996) [hereinafter “Conlisk II”]. 
 91. Oren Bar-Gill, Competition and Consumer Protection: Behavioral Economics Account, 
12-41 (Konkurrensverket Swedish Competition Authority, 2012), available at 
http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/Rapporter/Pros&Cons/rapport_pros_an
d_cons_consumer_protection.pdf. 
 92. Id. at 13-14 (explaining that, “A monopolist can similarly be expected to design prod-
ucts, contracts and pricing schemes to maximize the perceived (net) benefit from its products.”) 
(and that, “Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and misperceptions of their 
customers.”). 
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aware of the changes in its structure. It is plausible to assume that con-
sumers act separately and do not collect information on consumer pref-
erences. Therefore, the consumers do not have the actual aggregate data 
needed to estimate the nature and structure of the market demand curve. 
On the other hand, suppliers have the capacity to continuously collect 
this sort of information through sources such as data from its cash 
registers, consumer clubs, and market studies. Therefore, the suppliers 
who have vigorously collected the information necessary to make their 
business decisions are likely to have considerable insight into the mar-
kets’ supply and demand curves, insight that consumers do not appear 
to have as much access to. 
Now, let us assume asymmetric information in a product market 
where both rational suppliers and irrational consumers face an increase 
in the consumption tax rate. Let’s also assume that the suppliers and 
consumers are aware of the new tax rate and its effective date; it is 
plausible to assume that the consumer’s awareness of the tax change 
will influence his or her behavior.93 
As mentioned above, if an event that changes the supply curve is 
undisclosed to consumers, the consumers’ fairness effect might prevent 
suppliers from automatically adjusting prices to the equilibrium as pre-
dicted by neoclassical economics. Therefore, suppliers hoping to main-
tain their positive reputations are unlikely to change prices if they be-
lieve that customers might suspect them of being dishonest or 
manipulative. Consumption tax changes, however, are believed to be 
widely advertised and known to the general population; this enables the 
market to overcome the fairness constraint. Furthermore, because sup-
pliers are more likely to understand the structure and complexity of 
supply and demand more than consumers, as a result, suppliers have 
the opportunity to adjust market prices above the normal neoclassical 
equilibrium prices and consider the fact that consumers are systemati-
cally biased in estimating the normal or honest changes in market equi-
librium. 
 
 
 
 
 93. American economist Steven D. Levitt believes that Chrysler’s offer of rebates for fuel 
costing over $2.99 a gallon for new cars is a brilliant idea since it attracts prospective buyers 
without any financial loss to Chrysler. Individuals are more aware of the existence of tax on 
fuels since they see the price fluctuations every few days in the gas stations. Levitt, however, 
also believes that consumers exaggerate the significance of gas expenses in their overall 
budget. See generally STEVEN D. LEVITT, $2.99 Gas, FREAKONOMICS (May 12, 2008), available 
at http://freakonomics.com/2008/05/12/299-gas/. 
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The representativeness heuristic may be an explanation for the 
market’s biased equilibrium.94 Consumers apply this rule of behavior 
when determining whether an item is the result of a specific process 
or belongs to a specific class. For example, consumers would esti-
mate the probability of an item belonging to a group based on its re-
semblance to other familiar items in a product group. We argue that 
people aware of products’ price changes due to a higher consumption 
tax rate are likely to visit their local supermarket and try to estimate the 
fairness of that price change. In fact, some specialty goods unknowingly 
help consumers detect fair or unfair behavior by suppliers. There-
fore, if suppliers can identify those representative products, they 
would be able to manipulate the market by fixing the market price of 
the products that are not representative products above the normal equi-
librium price. Representative product prices will change to its normal 
equilibrium price or to a lower figure that reflects a price change that 
is accurate and honest. 
The availability heuristic95 may also bias consumers’ estimation of 
a price change’s fairness. The discussion here bears some similarities to 
that of the representativeness heuristic. As originally explained by 
Tversky and Kahneman,”[t]here are situations in which people assess 
the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the ease with 
which instances or occurrences can be brought to mind.”96  In our case, 
it is possible to represent the consumers’ dilemma as one that involves 
the mechanism of judging an event’s probability through available ex-
amples. When determining whether the price of each product they pur-
chase is the result of a tax increase that normally shifts to the consum-
ers as opposed to one resulting from supplier manipulation, consumers 
typically compare the new prices with the former prices of products 
 
 94. The Representativeness Heuristic was first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman in 
their article, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, supra note 89, at 1124-27. 
For a more detailed description and analysis of this form of heuristic, see JUDGMENT UNDER 
CERTAINTY, supra note 89, at 3-98, and see Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick, Repre-
sentativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment, in HEURISTICS & BIASES: 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49-81 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffin, and 
Daniel Kahnerman eds. 2002).  
 95. The availability heuristic was first introduced in Tversky & Kahneman’s Judgment un-
der Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, supra note 89, at 1127-28. For a more detailed descrip-
tion and analysis of the Availability Heuristic, see JUDGMENT UNDER HEURISTICS: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163-208 [hereinafter JUDGMENT UNDER HEURISTICS]. Also see, 
Norbert Schwarz & Leigh Ann Vaughn, The Availability heuristic revisited: Ease of recall and 
content of recall as distinct sources of information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103-19. 
 96. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, supra note 89, at 1127. 
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they can easily remember.97 If suppliers could identify those products, 
they would be able to better manipulate market prices. 
The anchoring and adjustment heuristic98 could be used by sup-
pliers in determining how much a product’s price could be adjusted 
without it being considered dishonest by consumers. The existing val-
ues of products have an ability to bias the estimations that consumers 
make. If suppliers can identify specific values of the products that could 
influence this estimation, they can use them to obtain higher prices in 
the post-tax raise market.99 The amounts $4.99, $5.00 and $5.50 can 
serve as good anchor prices for suppliers. For instance, if the price of 
a product with 15% VAT was $4.95 before the tax increased to 16%, 
and assuming a mild and similar price elasticity of supply and demand, 
the normal (or honest) new price in equilibrium in this product market, 
according to neoclassic economics, should be approximately $4.97. We 
argue that suppliers are able to use anchors for passing a higher tax 
change amount onto consumers. In this scenario, suppliers might use the 
anchor $4.99 as the new price instead of $4.97 if $4.99 is determined as 
a strong enough anchor. This would result in shifting almost the entire 
tax cost to the consumers. 
C.  Basic Products 
While the analysis above is generally valid for any product mar-
ket, the impact of its use would be stronger in markets for basic prod-
ucts. With rational players, when the government cuts the consumption 
tax rate, we can expect in the new market equilibrium for each product 
higher final prices (excluding consumption tax) and higher profits for 
suppliers. For consumers, we can expect lower prices (including con-
sumption tax), higher surplus, and a likelihood of consumers purchas-
ing products in higher quantities. 
 
 
 97. See NORBERT SCHWARZ & LEIGH ANN VAUGHN, The Availability heuristic revisited: 
Ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information, in HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 103-19. 
 98. The anchoring and adjustment heuristic was first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman 
in Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 1128-30. For fur-
ther analysis, see Nicholas Epley & Thomas Gilovich, Putting adjustment back in the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic, 12 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE  391-96 (2001); Gretchen B. Chapman & 
Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the irrelevant: Anchors in judgments of belief and value, in 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 120-38; and Chris Jan-
iszewski & Dan Uy, Precision of the Anchor Influences the Amount of Adjustment, 19(2) 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 121-27 (2008). 
 99. See Chris Janiszewski & Dan Uy, Precision of the anchor Influences the Amount of Ad-
justment, 19 PSYCH. SCI. 121 (2008). 
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The extent of the impact of tax cuts, as neoclassic economics pre-
dicts, depends on the elasticity of supply and demand.100  When de-
mand is inelastic relative to supply, meaning that when consumers are 
willing to buy almost the same quantities despite price increases for 
products with relatively fixed costs, the consumption rate cut will likely 
be shifted onto consumers.101 Basic products, which are characterized by 
a relatively inelastic demand curve, fit the scenario (as demonstrated in 
Figure 2 below). 
If the government decreases the consumption tax rate and if con-
sumers are rational, assuming that the tax is imposed directly onto 
suppliers and causes a downward shift of the supply curve (see curve 
St2 to curve St1  in Figure 2 below), neoclassic economics would pre-
dict a decrease in the supply curve for each product. This would lead to 
a new equilibrium in the basic product market with higher production 
(from quantity q2  to q1  in Figure 2 below) and a lower final price for 
consumers (from price pc2 to pc1). 
If the government decreases the consumption tax rate in a basic 
product market, based on that assumption, what could follow is the high 
ratio between the decrease in the final price (including consumption 
tax) for consumers (from pc2 to pc1  in Figure 2 below) and the pric-
es (excluding consumption tax) for suppliers (from ps2 to ps1). This 
would mean that the consumption tax cut can shift almost exclusively 
onto the consumers, which perfectly aligns with the government’s 
goal.102 
In this new equilibrium (after the tax cut where the supply curves 
move from St2  to St1), suppliers in each market would face a higher 
price (from ps2 to ps1) and a higher quantity (from q2 to q1), which 
would therefore result in lower profits (the added supplier profits are 
represented by the area of the trapezoid ps1FEps2 in Figure 2 below). 
The consumers, on the other end, would face a lower price (including 
tax) (pc1) with a higher quantity (q1), which would therefore result in 
greater consumer surplus (the added consumer surplus is represented 
in Figure 2 by the area of the trapezoid pc1BCpc2). When the de-
mand curve is relatively inelastic, such as in the market for basic prod-
ucts, the decrease in the final prices for consumers (including con-
sumption tax) and the added value to their surplus are relatively high. 
The increase in the final prices for suppliers and the added value to their 
 
 100. See, e.g., VARIAN, supra note 75; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 80, ibid. 
 101. See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 80, at 338-39. 
 102. In this article we assume that a government policy of reducing the consumption tax 
is officially aimed at benefiting consumers and promoting distribution goals. 
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profits are also relatively high (as demonstrated in Figure 2 below). 
Therefore, when the demand curve is relatively inelastic in a product 
market, the decrease in deadweight loss caused by the tax cut is mostly 
shifted onto consumers so that their market surplus increases much 
more than the suppliers’ profits. 
Now, assuming that there is asymmetric information in the product 
markets where rational suppliers and irrational consumers face the same 
decrease in the consumption tax rate. In this scenario, suppliers will 
supposedly be able to set market prices above the normal neoclassic 
equilibrium prices. In markets where demand is inelastic, there appears 
to be a relatively wider gap between the product’s former price (includ-
ing consumption tax) and the normal or honest new price. As a result, it 
should be expected that the suppliers who identified the opportunity 
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to gain more from consumers would try to manipulate the market 
where more consumer surplus could be shifted onto suppliers. 
In conclusion, whenever the government considers a consumption 
tax decrease, it should take into account that necessities and basic goods 
more commonly purchased by low-income families (assuming that low-
income families consume more necessities in relation to families with 
higher income) have a relatively inelastic demand.103 So, despite the 
government’s intentions, the normal (or honest) equilibrium meant to 
benefit low-income consumers after a tax decrease might, in actuality, 
benefit the suppliers more. 
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: EXAMINING THE POSSIBLE PRICING  
DISPLAY RULES 
A.  Tax Inclusive Rule 
The tax rate price displays previously mentioned are generally the 
result of consumer protection laws implemented to provide consumers 
with necessary information for their purchasing decisions.104  However, 
if we account for consumption tax changes and consumer biases, then 
this type of information is insufficient. Our claim is mainly relevant in 
situations where governments lower consumption taxes in order to 
lessen the cost of consumer’s living expenses. 
In this scenario, suppliers may take advantage of consumers’ 
tendencies to base their decisions on heuristics by fixing market prices 
above the equilibrium to shift a portion of the potentially increased sur-
plus from the consumers onto themselves. This shift would be especial-
ly true in markets for goods and necessities commonly purchased in 
large quantities by low-income families. Rules that govern the final 
price display are not enough to change this scenario (please note that 
this analysis also applies when governments increase the consumption 
tax rate). 
 
 
 103. See George S. Tolley & R. W. Gieseman, Consumer Demand Explained by Measura-
ble Utility Changes, 31 ECONOMETRICA 499 (1963); see generally MICHAEL PARKIN, 
MELANIE POWELL & KENT MATTHEWS, ECONOMICS 75 (2002); Mark Walbert, Tutorial 4: 
Elasticity, INTERMEDIATE MACROECONOMICS (ILLINOIS STATE UNIVERSITY), available at  
http://my.ilstu.edu/~mswalber/ECO240/Tutorials/Tut04/Tutorial04a.html (last visited Nov. 21, 
2014); Marat Ibragimov & Rustam Ibragimov, Market Demand Elasticity and Income, 
32 Econ. Theory 579–87 (2007). 
 104. See infra Section III. 
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B.  Tax Exclusive Rule 
Consumers might be less sensitive to the changes in final prices 
due to consumption tax cuts when the taxes are not originally included 
in the prices. This display system, however, requires consumers to cal-
culate final prices when navigating store shelves if they wish to shop 
within their budgets . The already difficult task of calculating final pric-
es will then become even more confusing when consumer tax changes 
because consumers are prevented from relying on their previous pur-
chasing decisions. When a tax cut is imposed, the information gap be-
tween suppliers and consumers presumably widens, causing consumers 
to make more calculations; and as mentioned above, consumers tend to 
rely on heuristics when making purchasing decisions. The widened in-
formation gap and resulting reliance on heuristics will thus encourage 
suppliers to further manipulate markets prices. 
On the other hand, we claim that the tax exclusive rule, although 
insufficient to eliminate market inefficiencies, has a compromising ef-
fect on price increases. First, recall the neoclassical argument: that when 
governments cut the consumption tax rate, the product prices are pre-
dicted to shift up for suppliers while they simultaneously shift down 
for consumers.105 Furthermore, recall the behavioral economic argu-
ment: given irrational consumers and their use of heuristics, suppliers 
have the ability to manipulate the market by fixing the market price of 
most products above the normal equilibrium price.106  If suppliers are 
required to display the product price without tax, then this could help 
consumers by having the price display act as a counter-effect to moder-
ate the price increase (before including tax). This mitigating effect 
would emerge first from the fairness effect—the consumers’ potential 
belief that price changes are dishonest107—and second, from the con-
sumers’ ability to use the former price without tax as a perceptual an-
chor.108 
Notably, this compromising effect would also work in the oppo-
site direction by helping suppliers manipulate the markets when gov-
ernments increase (or decrease, as described in the paragraph above) 
the consumption tax rate. In this case, neoclassic economics predicts 
that the product prices for suppliers be lowered. However, the fairness 
effect and the use of the former price as an anchor, as promoted by 
the tax exclusive rule, actually help suppliers shift prices up and ma-
 
 105. VARIAN, supra note 75, at 35-42. 
 106. See the analysis supra at Section V. 
 107. See the analysis supra at Section V. 
 108. See the analysis supra at Section V. 
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nipulate the market.109 
C.  Net and Total Price Rule 
As stated above, there are two main schemes for displaying 
consumption taxes: either by having the tax included or excluded from 
the price. We recommend a third system to overcome the psychological 
barriers described in this article. While this system aims to be a balance 
between the two, it does tend toward the tax- included scheme. Prices 
should be displayed in a fixed pattern that includes the following el-
ements for each product: the net price (before tax), the tax rate, tax 
amount, and the final price (after tax).110  For example, if the net prod-
uct price is $6 and the tax rate is 16%, then the figures $6, 16%, $0.96, 
and $6.96 should appear on the product label to represent those four re-
spective values. Providing complete information, especially when uni-
formly displayed, can prevent consumer misunderstandings and miscal-
culations. 
When the displayed prices for each product include these four el-
ements, consumers will be more sensitive to the changes in final prices 
due to consumption tax cuts. This way, consumers will also have a bet-
ter sense of how suppliers react to tax cuts. The detailed information 
on the label will not only provide consumers with the necessary 
knowledge of the final price, which allows them to avoid the more 
complex calculations required when this information is missing but it 
will also inform consumers of the gap between the total and net prices, 
which enables them to better monitor supplier behavior. In the above 
example, if a government decides to decrease the tax rate by one per-
centage point to 15%, the normal (or honest) new equilibrium in this 
product market, given a mild symmetric price elasticity of supply and 
demand, will be approximately $6.03, 15%,  $0.90, and $6.93, respec-
tively (see the graphic illustration of this example in Figure 3 below). 
In this instance, any attempts made by the suppliers to shift the reve-
nues—for example, by fixing the total price at $6.95 or even $6.99—
will be more noticeable. This display system, therefore, can successful-
ly act as a deterrent factor for suppliers. 
 
 109. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on 
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECO. REV. 728, 737-38 (1986).  
 110. This information is even more inclusive than the price display suggested by Chetty, 
Looney & Kroft, supra note 65. In Exhibit 1, specific values for pre-tax price + “sales tax” (with-
out specifying its value) = a specific value after tax, for example: “$5.79 + sales tax = $6.22”. 
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We do not expect this rule to entirely eliminate the consumers’ use 
of heuristics whenever prices change due to consumption tax rate 
changes. After all, heuristics can be seen as an efficient cognitive alter-
native to costly calculations. This proposed rule is designed to limit 
consumers’ use of heuristics (especially those that are often abused by 
suppliers) and hedge the suppliers’ ability to vigorously manipulate 
product market prices. Furthermore, the rule’s advantages come with 
minimal costs. Due to its direct expected effect on consumers’ behav-
ior and its simplicity, this rule will best promote distributional justice 
and economic efficiency. 
D.  Comparative Net and Total Price Rule 
A price display rule that has the potential to further eliminate sup-
pliers’ ability to manipulate products’ market prices would compel 
suppliers to present the information that is required under the net and 
total price rule, but with comparative data. Under this rule, prices would 
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be displayed in a fixed pattern that includes the current and past data for 
each constituent value both before and after the consumption tax rate 
change. A somewhat modified and perhaps a bit less costly version of 
that rule would simply be to mark in another color, for example, red, 
the pre-tax value if it was changed due to any recent tax cut. 
This display pattern would be as follows: in one row the current 
net price (before tax), tax rate, tax amount, and total price (after tax); in 
another row, the equivalent value of amount before the recent consump-
tion tax rate change. This rule could further minimize the suppliers’ 
power to manipulate prices, but at an extra cost. If the former proposed 
rule is determined to be ineffective, this stricter rule could be applied. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
To conclude, we claim that since consumers may not be aware of 
tax rate cuts, in order for consumption tax reductions to effectively in-
crease consumers’ wealth and prevent this benefit from being shift-
ed onto suppliers, a purely tax-based analysis is insufficient. We treat 
the consumption tax cut as dysfunctional and a partial mechanism for 
contributing to consumer wealth. In order for tax reform to be effective, 
we must also analyze its acceptance by the target audience in terms of 
common cognitive biases used by consumers in purchase decisions. 
Which mechanism can mitigate consumer heuristics and accomplish 
this goal?  
The existing consumer protection laws represent a fine approach 
for drawing consumer attention to tax reforms such as reducing VAT or 
RST rates and making the tax law visible to consumers. Here, we out-
lined four possible mechanisms for displaying prices and believe that a 
more detailed price display, with a net and total price, or a comparative 
rule, can overcome the cognitive biases created in the product mar-
ket due to tax cuts.  
In a world where consumers are only faintly aware of taxes and 
specifically of tax cuts, mainly while purchasing necessities, consumer 
protection laws are a necessary complement to taxation. We do not ar-
gue that this is the only solution for the problem: other regulatory in-
struments may also achieve the same objective. However, the exist-
ence of laws aimed at benefiting the consumers combined with 
active enforcement can serve as an efficient solution to tax invisibility. 
